Resolving merge conflicts with master

This commit is contained in:
zacharysarah
2017-11-30 18:53:33 -06:00
5068 changed files with 25074 additions and 855452 deletions
+14 -16
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ title: Using RBAC Authorization
* TOC
{:toc}
Role-Based Access Control ("RBAC") uses the "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" API group
Role-Based Access Control ("RBAC") uses the "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" API group
to drive authorization decisions, allowing admins to dynamically configure policies
through the Kubernetes API.
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ roleRef:
```
Finally, a `ClusterRoleBinding` may be used to grant permission at the cluster level and in all
namespaces. The following `ClusterRoleBinding` allows any user in the group "manager" to read
namespaces. The following `ClusterRoleBinding` allows any user in the group "manager" to read
secrets in any namespace.
```yaml
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ reserved for Kubernetes system use, and so the admin should ensure
usernames do not contain this prefix by accident.
Group information in Kubernetes is currently provided by the Authenticator
modules. Groups, like users, are represented as strings, and that string
modules. Groups, like users, are represented as strings, and that string
has no format requirements, other than that the prefix `system:` is reserved.
[Service Accounts](/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/) have usernames with the `system:serviceaccount:` prefix and belong
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ and updates default cluster role bindings with any missing subjects.
This allows the cluster to repair accidental modifications,
and to keep roles and rolebindings up-to-date as permissions and subjects change in new releases.
To opt out of this reconciliation, set the `rbac.authorization.kubernetes.io/autoupdate`
To opt out of this reconciliation, set the `rbac.authorization.kubernetes.io/autoupdate`
annotation on a default cluster role or rolebinding to `false`.
Be aware that missing default permissions and subjects can result in non-functional clusters.
@@ -463,9 +463,7 @@ The permissions required by individual control loops are contained in the <a hre
<td><b>system:node</b></td>
<td>None in 1.8+</td>
<td>Allows access to resources required by the kubelet component, <b>including read access to all secrets, and write access to all pod status objects</b>.
As of 1.7, use of the [Node authorizer](/docs/admin/authorization/node/)
and [NodeRestriction admission plugin](/docs/admin/admission-controllers#NodeRestriction)
is recommended instead of this role, and allow granting API access to kubelets based on the pods scheduled to run on them.
As of 1.7, use of the <a href="/docs/admin/authorization/node/">Node authorizer</a> and <a href="/docs/admin/admission-controllers/#noderestriction">NodeRestriction admission plugin</a> is recommended instead of this role, and allow granting API access to kubelets based on the pods scheduled to run on them.
Prior to 1.7, this role was automatically bound to the `system:nodes` group.
In 1.7, this role was automatically bound to the `system:nodes` group if the `Node` authorization mode is not enabled.
In 1.8+, no binding is automatically created.
@@ -506,7 +504,7 @@ This is commonly used by add-on API servers for unified authentication and autho
<tr>
<td><b>system:kube-dns</b></td>
<td><b>kube-dns</b> service account in the <b>kube-system</b> namespace</td>
<td>Role for the <a href="/docs/admin/dns/">kube-dns</a> component.</td>
<td>Role for the <a href="/docs/concepts/services-networking/dns-pod-service/">kube-dns</a> component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><b>system:node-bootstrapper</b></td>
@@ -530,7 +528,7 @@ This is commonly used by add-on API servers for unified authentication and autho
The [Kubernetes controller manager](/docs/admin/kube-controller-manager/) runs core control loops.
When invoked with `--use-service-account-credentials`, each control loop is started using a separate service account.
Corresponding roles exist for each control loop, prefixed with `system:controller:`.
If the controller manager is not started with `--use-service-account-credentials`,
If the controller manager is not started with `--use-service-account-credentials`,
it runs all control loops using its own credential, which must be granted all the relevant roles.
These roles include:
@@ -570,7 +568,7 @@ containing that permission. To allow a user to create/update roles:
1. Grant them a role that allows them to create/update `Role` or `ClusterRole` objects, as desired.
2. Grant them roles containing the permissions you would want them to be able to set in a `Role` or `ClusterRole`. If they attempt to create or modify a `Role` or `ClusterRole` with permissions they themselves have not been granted, the API request will be forbidden.
A user can only create/update a role binding if they already have all the permissions contained in the referenced role
A user can only create/update a role binding if they already have all the permissions contained in the referenced role
(at the same scope as the role binding) *or* if they've been given explicit permission to perform the `bind` verb on the referenced role.
For example, if "user-1" does not have the ability to list secrets cluster-wide, they cannot create a `ClusterRoleBinding`
to a role that grants that permission. To allow a user to create/update role bindings:
@@ -669,7 +667,7 @@ In order from most secure to least secure, the approaches are:
and for the service account to be created (via the API, application manifest, `kubectl create serviceaccount`, etc.).
For example, grant read-only permission within "my-namespace" to the "my-sa" service account:
```shell
kubectl create rolebinding my-sa-view \
--clusterrole=view \
@@ -684,7 +682,7 @@ In order from most secure to least secure, the approaches are:
NOTE: Permissions given to the "default" service account are available to any pod in the namespace that does not specify a `serviceAccountName`.
For example, grant read-only permission within "my-namespace" to the "default" service account:
```shell
kubectl create rolebinding default-view \
--clusterrole=view \
@@ -694,9 +692,9 @@ In order from most secure to least secure, the approaches are:
Many [add-ons](/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/addons/) currently run as the "default" service account in the "kube-system" namespace.
To allow those add-ons to run with super-user access, grant cluster-admin permissions to the "default" service account in the "kube-system" namespace.
NOTE: Enabling this means the "kube-system" namespace contains secrets that grant super-user access to the API.
```shell
kubectl create clusterrolebinding add-on-cluster-admin \
--clusterrole=cluster-admin \
@@ -709,7 +707,7 @@ In order from most secure to least secure, the approaches are:
you can grant a role to the service account group for that namespace.
For example, grant read-only permission within "my-namespace" to to all service accounts in that namespace:
```shell
kubectl create rolebinding serviceaccounts-view \
--clusterrole=view \
@@ -722,7 +720,7 @@ In order from most secure to least secure, the approaches are:
If you don't want to manage permissions per-namespace, you can grant a cluster-wide role to all service accounts.
For example, grant read-only permission across all namespaces to all service accounts in the cluster:
```shell
kubectl create clusterrolebinding serviceaccounts-view \
--clusterrole=view \