Fixed typos
Fixed some typos and improved grammar.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -22,15 +22,15 @@ The good practices laid out here should be read in conjunction with the general
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### Least privilege
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### Least privilege
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Ideally minimal RBAC rights should be assigned to users and service accounts. Only permissions
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Ideally, minimal RBAC rights should be assigned to users and service accounts. Only permissions
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explicitly required for their operation should be used. Whilst each cluster will be different,
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explicitly required for their operation should be used. While each cluster will be different,
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some general rules that can be applied are :
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some general rules that can be applied are :
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- Assign permissions at the namespace level where possible. Use RoleBindings as opposed to
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- Assign permissions at the namespace level where possible. Use RoleBindings as opposed to
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ClusterRoleBindings to give users rights only within a specific namespace.
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ClusterRoleBindings to give users rights only within a specific namespace.
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- Avoid providing wildcard permissions when possible, especially to all resources.
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- Avoid providing wildcard permissions when possible, especially to all resources.
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As Kubernetes is an extensible system, providing wildcard access gives rights
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As Kubernetes is an extensible system, providing wildcard access gives rights
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not just to all object types presently in the cluster, but also to all future object types
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not just to all object types present in the cluster, but also to all future object types
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which are created in the future.
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which are created in the future.
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- Administrators should not use `cluster-admin` accounts except where specifically needed.
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- Administrators should not use `cluster-admin` accounts except where specifically needed.
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Providing a low privileged account with [impersonation rights](/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/#user-impersonation)
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Providing a low privileged account with [impersonation rights](/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/#user-impersonation)
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@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ the RBAC rights provided by default can provide opportunities for security harde
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In general, changes should not be made to rights provided to `system:` accounts some options
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In general, changes should not be made to rights provided to `system:` accounts some options
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to harden cluster rights exist:
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to harden cluster rights exist:
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- Review bindings for the `system:unauthenticated` group and remove where possible, as this gives
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- Review bindings for the `system:unauthenticated` group and remove them where possible, as this gives
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access to anyone who can contact the API server at a network level.
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access to anyone who can contact the API server at a network level.
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- Avoid the default auto-mounting of service account tokens by setting
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- Avoid the default auto-mounting of service account tokens by setting
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`automountServiceAccountToken: false`. For more details, see
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`automountServiceAccountToken: false`. For more details, see
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@@ -122,19 +122,19 @@ PersistentVolumes, and constrained users should use PersistentVolumeClaims to ac
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### Access to `proxy` subresource of Nodes
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### Access to `proxy` subresource of Nodes
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Users with access to the proxy sub-resource of node objects have rights to the Kubelet API,
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Users with access to the proxy sub-resource of node objects have rights to the Kubelet API,
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which allows for command execution on every pod on the node(s) which they have rights to.
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which allows for command execution on every pod on the node(s) to which they have rights.
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This access bypasses audit logging and admission control, so care should be taken before
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This access bypasses audit logging and admission control, so care should be taken before
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granting rights to this resource.
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granting rights to this resource.
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### Escalate verb
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### Escalate verb
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Generally the RBAC system prevents users from creating clusterroles with more rights than
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Generally, the RBAC system prevents users from creating clusterroles with more rights than
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they possess. The exception to this is the `escalate` verb. As noted in the [RBAC documentation](/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/#restrictions-on-role-creation-or-update),
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they possess. The exception to this is the `escalate` verb. As noted in the [RBAC documentation](/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/#restrictions-on-role-creation-or-update),
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users with this right can effectively escalate their privileges.
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users with this right can effectively escalate their privileges.
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### Bind verb
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### Bind verb
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Similar to the `escalate` verb, granting users this right allows for bypass of Kubernetes
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Similar to the `escalate` verb, granting users this right allows for the bypass of Kubernetes
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in-built protections against privilege escalation, allowing users to create bindings to
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in-built protections against privilege escalation, allowing users to create bindings to
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roles with rights they do not already have.
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roles with rights they do not already have.
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